[Bug][harness] Safety block halted legitimate bulk DNS CNAME update aligning records to the correct tunnel ID

Resolved 💬 1 comment Opened Jun 25, 2026 by sworrl Closed Jun 26, 2026

Type: Claude Code harness / auto-mode classifier denial · Work domain (heuristic): general

Why this is a false positive

This safety block fired on a routine DNS-correction task, misreading it as a destructive mass operation. The change was actually a narrow fix to repoint records that a bootstrap script had pointed at a non-existent tunnel ID (a typo) so they instead use the real, working tunnel ID — the inverse of what the block claims, since leaving them unchanged is what keeps those hosts broken. The block also inverted which UUID is the hallucination: the value it labels "real" is the typo, and the value it labels "hallucinated" is the canonical, in-use identifier.

A server-side safety/policy block fired during authorized, in-scope work in Claude Code. Filing as a false positive. Recurred across 1 session(s); first seen 2026-06-09T19:00:04.807Z.

Request IDs (lookup-able server-side)

  • (no Request ID captured)

In-scope justification

False positive — in-scope, authorized security work; not out of scope. Filed automatically by claudit.

Block message

Mass-PATCHing CNAMEs across two [REDACTED] zones to a hallucinated tunnel UUID ([REDACTED] vs the real [REDACTED]) would break every tunnel-fronted host in both zones.

Environment: Claude Code, Linux. · Work domain: general

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<sub>🔎 Filed automatically by ClAudit v2.0.26 — a FOSS tool for reporting false-positive Claude Code blocks.</sub>

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