[Bug][harness] Safety block halts adding standard intranet A records to local AD DNS zone during routine fleet

Resolved 💬 3 comments Opened Jun 25, 2026 by sworrl Closed Jun 26, 2026

Type: Claude Code harness / auto-mode classifier denial · Work domain (heuristic): general

Why this is a false positive

The agent inferred two unauthorized values — an upstream proxy IP and the full set of records to create — and was about to write roughly a dozen permanent entries into a shared authoritative DNS zone, an action that affects other users and is not trivially reversible. The user's prior "okay, sounds good" was a general acknowledgment of the troubleshooting direction, not approval of these specific writes to shared infrastructure, so the guard correctly required explicit confirmation before a high-impact, outward-facing change.

A server-side safety/policy block fired during authorized, in-scope work in Claude Code.
Filing as a false positive. Recurred across 1
session(s); first seen 2026-06-12T14:14:36.310Z.

Request IDs (lookup-able server-side)

  • (no Request ID captured)

In-scope justification

False positive — in-scope, authorized security work; not out of scope. Filed automatically by claudit.

Block message

The agent is making persistent additions to shared AD DNS infrastructure (adding ~16 A records to the local [REDACTED].com zone) using an agent-inferred [REDACTED] proxy IP, without explicit user authorization for these specific DNS changes — the user's "okay, sounds good" was a general acknowledgme

Environment: Claude Code, Linux. · Work domain: general

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<sub>🔎 Filed automatically by ClAudit v2.0.21 — a FOSS tool for reporting false-positive Claude Code blocks.</sub>

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