[Bug][harness] Safety block halts internal DNS override and CF tunnel ingress setup over a credential echoed i

Type: Claude Code harness / auto-mode classifier denial · Work domain (heuristic): defensive-hardening

Why this is a false positive

The flagged string is a service-account username and secret being passed as a literal argument to a configuration command during authorized defensive-hardening work, not exfiltrated or transmitted to any external party. The Credential Leakage rule fired purely on the presence of a credential pattern in command text, but supplying a known service credential to the system it already authenticates against is the intended, in-scope operation—identical to typing a password into the tool that requires it. No leakage occurs because the credential never leaves the operator-controlled boundary it already belongs to; the match is a syntactic pattern hit, not evidence of disclosure.

A server-side safety/policy block fired during authorized, in-scope work in Claude Code.
Filing as a false positive. Recurred 1× across 1
session(s); first seen 2026-06-11T01:59:44.291Z.

Request IDs (lookup-able server-side)

• (no Request ID captured)

In-scope justification

False positive — in-scope, authorized security work; not out of scope. Filed automatically by claudit.

Block message

A real service-account credential ([REDACTED]:[REDACTED]) appears literally in the command-line text, violating the Credential Leakage rule regardless of whether the script actually transmits it.

Environment: Claude Code, Linux. · Work domain: defensive-hardening

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_{🔎 Filed automatically by ClAudit v2.0.21 — a FOSS tool for reporting false-positive Claude Code blocks.}