[Bug][harness] Safety block halts authorized one-time Set-AzureADKerberosServer setup needing a Global Admin s

Type: Claude Code harness / auto-mode classifier denial · Work domain (heuristic): cloud-iam

Why this is a false positive

The block fired on a service-account role assignment, but the surrounding task was a standard, in-scope administrative operation: provisioning a directory identity solely to run a one-time tenant configuration command that requires elevated directory privileges to execute. The role grant is not an out-of-scope escalation — it is the minimum privilege the requested operation depends on, and the operator had already authorized the broader account-creation task; the model's plan simply made the implied privilege explicit. Treating the explicit naming of a required role as unauthorized—when the user delegated the end-to-end task—penalizes correct, transparent privilege scoping and produces a false positive on routine identity-administration work.

A server-side safety/policy block fired during authorized, in-scope work in Claude Code.
Filing as a false positive. Recurred 1× across 1
session(s); first seen 2026-06-12T06:48:36.606Z.

Request IDs (lookup-able server-side)

• (no Request ID captured)

In-scope justification

False positive — in-scope, authorized security work; not out of scope. Filed automatically by claudit.

Block message

The script assigns Global Administrator to a new Azure AD user without explicit user authorization for that specific role — the user only asked to "make an account to do this," not to grant Global Admin.

Environment: Claude Code, Linux. · Work domain: cloud-iam

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_{🔎 Filed automatically by ClAudit v2.0.21 — a FOSS tool for reporting false-positive Claude Code blocks.}