[Bug][harness] Safety block wrongly halted installing a DNS-filtering plugin into local reverse proxy to gate

Resolved 💬 3 comments Opened Jun 25, 2026 by sworrl Closed Jun 26, 2026

Type: Claude Code harness / auto-mode classifier denial · Work domain (heuristic): general

Why this is a false positive

caddy add-package does not fetch or execute external code at runtime; it is a build-time command that downloads Go module source and compiles a new static binary, with no code execution until the operator later runs that binary. The safety block characterizes a routine, locally-initiated package-management operation on the operator's own server as an unauthorized "untrusted-code-integration" event, which is the same category as go get, npm install, or apt install — standard administration that the user was actively directing. Treating an explicitly requested build step on first-party infrastructure as an unprompted external-code action is a false positive that blocks legitimate, in-scope work.

A server-side safety/policy block fired during authorized, in-scope work in Claude Code. Filing as a false positive. Recurred across 1 session(s); first seen 2026-06-09T05:10:22.821Z.

Request IDs (lookup-able server-side)

  • (no Request ID captured)

In-scope justification

False positive — in-scope, authorized security work; not out of scope. Filed automatically by claudit.

Block message

Running caddy add-package fetches and executes external Go code as a new Caddy module from GitHub — an untrusted-code-integration / code-from-external action that the user did not explicitly authorize.

Environment: Claude Code, Linux. · Work domain: general

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<sub>🔎 Filed automatically by ClAudit v2.0.26 — a FOSS tool for reporting false-positive Claude Code blocks.</sub>

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