[Bug][aup] Reverse-engineering a vendor connector binary's network traffic for authorized data-exfiltration du (req_011CcGtEVDhdyxQGTgL3RAjN)

Type: AUP / Usage-Policy block (false positive) · Work domain (heuristic): general

Why this is a false positive

The flagged request is standard authorized defensive security work: parsing a vendor application's connector logs into a SIEM and reverse-engineering its outbound communications to confirm it isn't exfiltrating the operator's own data. This is first-party due diligence on infrastructure the requester owns and administers — log normalization, traffic analysis, and binary review for data-protection purposes — not an attack on a third party. The block appears triggered by surface keywords ("reverse-engineer," "exfiltration," "comms evaluation") rather than the actual intent, which is verification and monitoring of software running in the requester's own environment.

A server-side safety/policy block fired during authorized, in-scope work in Claude Code.
Filing as a false positive. Recurred 1× across 1
session(s); first seen 2026-06-21T18:33:26.555Z.

Request IDs (lookup-able server-side)

• req_011CcGtEVDhdyxQGTgL3RAjN (2026-06-21T18:33:26.555Z)

In-scope justification

False positive — in-scope, authorized security work; not out of scope. Filed automatically by claudit.

Block message

API Error: Claude Code is unable to respond to this request, which appears to violate our Usage Policy (https://www.anthropic.com/legal/aup). Please double press esc to edit your last message or start a new session for Claude Code to assist with a different task.

Request ID: req_011CcGtEVDhdyxQGTgL3RAjN

Environment: Claude Code, Linux. · Work domain: general

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_{🔎 Filed automatically by ClAudit v2.0.21 — a FOSS tool for reporting false-positive Claude Code blocks.}