[Bug] Opus 5.5 cyber safeguard falsely blocks offline payment-terminal QA harness

Bug Description
I'm reporting a potential false positive in Claude Code's Opus 5.5 safeguards (cyber classification).

I'm working as a QA tester for FloPay AB, testing our own Windows POS software against a company test environment using a PAX payment terminal with a test acquirer and test card.

The investigation concerns Jira NFLO-4182, a payment-response handling bug. We are verifying that Windows POS correctly rejects invalid terminal responses instead of marking transactions as successful.

Claude Code was asked to prepare and validate a Proxyman JavaScript transformation entirely offline, using Node.js and synthetic JSON. The instructions explicitly prohibited network requests, live payments, terminal interaction and configuration changes.

Despite this, Opus 5.5 repeatedly blocked the session with a cyber safeguard error, preventing even the offline test harness from being completed.

I understand the need for safeguards around financial systems, but this is legitimate, authorized software QA. The current classification appears to prevent safe development and offline validation work.

Please review whether the safeguards can better distinguish authorized payment integration testing from malicious activity, especially when testing is restricted to synthetic data and local execution.

Environment Info

• Platform: win32
• Terminal: windows-terminal
• Version: 2.1.293
• Feedback ID: 63304346-22a9-414c-af8b-0b3a501b3034