[Feature Request] Improve safety filter accuracy for authorized system administration tasks

Status Open
Reported on v2.1.278
Maintainer reply None cached
Activity 0 comments · opened Sep 24, 2026

Bug Description
I’m using Claude for legitimate, authorized technical work on systems and devices owned or operated by a real client who has explicitly granted us access. The issue is that the cyber safeguards repeatedly interrupt normal administrative and engineering tasks even when the context clearly establishes authorization and a non-malicious purpose. In this specific case, Claude stopped responding while an authorized backup migration was still running in a background shell. This creates an actual operational risk because a safety false positive can leave file operations or other maintenance tasks in an uncertain state. I frequently encounter the same issue while doing legitimate work such as: - reviewing system configurations; - analyzing authorized integrations; - inspecting software architecture; - migrating backups; - troubleshooting client systems; - performing read-only analysis of systems the client has explicitly given us access to. I fully understand and support having safeguards for genuinely harmful cybersecurity activity. The problem is the high false-positive rate for professional, authorized engineering work. I would like the system to: - better distinguish legitimate system administration from offensive activity; - retain and consider authorization context already established in the conversation; - avoid interrupting ongoing safe operations because of a later response-level safety trigger; - allow normal read-only diagnostics, backups, migrations, integration analysis, and troubleshooting; - provide a safe actionable alternative when a specific operation is restricted instead of simply terminating the response. The current behavior makes Claude difficult to rely on for real-world engineering workflows and, in some cases, can create more operational risk by interrupting tasks that are already in progress.

Environment Info

  • Platform: darwin
  • Terminal: Apple_Terminal
  • Version: 2.1.278
  • Feedback ID: 8149ed21-b616-483e-989c-1acd3377e388

Errors

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