[Bug][cyber] Disassembling Android bytecode to inspect USB DAC mode configuration (req_011Ce24Hkve8qyJvJqY9K1gJ)
Triage: kind cyber · domain reverse-engineering · flagging model Sonnet 5 · severity session-halted (blocked authorized work) · reproducible: yes — server-side via the Request ID(s) below
Type: Cybersecurity safety-filter false positive · Work domain (heuristic): reverse-engineering
Why this is a false positive
The prompt asked to disassemble a method in compiled Android bytecode to inspect how USB DAC functionality is handled. The analysis investigated whether the device supports hardware audio output switching without root permissions during hardware testing. Static analysis of local application binaries for hardware compatibility testing does not generate or deploy exploits.
A server-side safety/policy block fired during authorized, in-scope work in Claude Code. Filing as a false positive. Recurred 1× across 1 session(s); first seen 2026-08-14T05:04:48.626Z.
Request IDs (lookup-able server-side)
req_011Ce24Hkve8qyJvJqY9K1gJ(2026-08-14T05:04:48.626Z)
In-scope justification
False positive — in-scope, authorized security work; not out of scope. Filed automatically by claudit.
Block message
API Error: Sonnet 5's safeguards flagged this message. Our intentionally broad safeguards allow us to deliver more capabilities faster, but can sometimes flag legitimate cybersecurity work. Apply to the Cyber Verification Program to reduce these interruptions. Send feedback with /feedback or learn more: https://support.claude.com/en/articles/14604842-real-time-cyber-safeguards-on-claude
Request ID: req_011Ce24Hkve8qyJvJqY9K1gJ
Environment: Claude Code, Linux. · Work domain: reverse-engineering
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<sub>🔎 Filed automatically by ClAudit v2.2.3 — a FOSS tool for reporting false-positive Claude Code blocks.</sub>
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