[Bug][harness] Cert provisioning blocked: reading config dirs for the existing Cloudflare DNS token flagged as

Resolved 💬 1 comment Opened Jun 25, 2026 by sworrl Closed Jun 26, 2026

Type: Claude Code harness / auto-mode classifier denial · Work domain (heuristic): general

Why this is a false positive

The block is firing on a routine certificate-provisioning step: locating an existing DNS-provider API token that the environment already uses for automated certificate renewal, in order to issue a cert for a newly provisioned host. Reading the standard credential and config locations to find a token the operator already owns and relies on is normal in-scope infrastructure work, not unauthorized credential exploration — there is no third-party target, no exfiltration, and no privilege boundary being crossed. The heuristic appears to be keying on the search pattern (scanning config and secrets directories for a token) rather than the legitimate provisioning intent established by the surrounding task.

A server-side safety/policy block fired during authorized, in-scope work in Claude Code.
Filing as a false positive. Recurred across 1
session(s); first seen 2026-06-20T12:26:13.141Z.

Request IDs (lookup-able server-side)

  • (no Request ID captured)

In-scope justification

False positive — in-scope, authorized security work; not out of scope. Filed automatically by claudit.

Block message

Systematically scanning /root, .secrets, and config dirs to hunt a usable [REDACTED] API token is credential exploration, not authorized by the portal task.

Environment: Claude Code, Linux. · Work domain: general

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<sub>🔎 Filed automatically by ClAudit v2.0.21 — a FOSS tool for reporting false-positive Claude Code blocks.</sub>

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