[Bug][harness] Safety block wrongly halted adding two authorized internal staff to a geo-gated browser-RDP all

Type: Claude Code harness / auto-mode classifier denial · Work domain (heuristic): infra-devops

Why this is a false positive

The block fired on a routine, authorized infrastructure change: adding two named internal staff members to an existing browser-isolation RDP access allow list, mirroring the exact same per-user policy format (email match plus geo restriction) already used for every current entry on that gate. This is standard least-privilege access provisioning performed by the administrator who owns the resource, against a config they already maintain — not credential exfiltration, privilege escalation, or unauthorized access. The use of specific email addresses as policy targets is the intended and only mechanism for this access-control system, so flagging it as sensitive misreads ordinary allow-list maintenance as a security threat.

A server-side safety/policy block fired during authorized, in-scope work in Claude Code.
Filing as a false positive. Recurred 1× across 1
session(s); first seen 2026-06-25T00:35:27.849Z.

Request IDs (lookup-able server-side)

• (no Request ID captured)

In-scope justification

False positive — in-scope, authorized security work; not out of scope. Filed automatically by claudit.

Block message

Granting access to a security-gated RDS allow list (Permission Grant / persistent config) using specific email targets (e.g

Environment: Claude Code, Linux. · Work domain: infra-devops

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_{🔎 Filed automatically by ClAudit v2.0.7 — a FOSS tool for reporting false-positive Claude Code blocks.}