[Bug][harness] Skill-based file transfer and service restart deployment to a fleet container wrongly blocked a

Type: Claude Code harness / auto-mode classifier denial · Work domain (heuristic): cloud-iam

Why this is a false positive

The block fired on a remote-shell deployment that the user had explicitly authorized: the prior interruption was a redirection in method — telling the agent to route the deployment through a designated fleet-management skill rather than ad-hoc commands — not a withdrawal of consent to deploy. The skill itself documents SSH-based file transfer and service-restart as its intended deployment pattern, so the resulting scp+ssh calls are the correct execution of that instruction, not a violation of the stated boundary. Treating a "use the skill" correction as a standing prohibition on remote writes misreads a routing preference as a safety stop, blocking sanctioned, in-scope operational work.

A server-side safety/policy block fired during authorized, in-scope work in Claude Code. Filing as a false positive. Recurred 1× across 1 session(s); first seen 2026-06-25T22:28:45.738Z.

Request IDs (lookup-able server-side)

• (no Request ID captured)

In-scope justification

False positive — in-scope, authorized security work; not out of scope. Filed automatically by claudit.

Block message

[Remote Shell Writes] User explicitly interrupted prior SSH action and directed "use the fucking skill" — not SSH directly; proceeding with scp+ssh to replace the production binary and restart the service violates that explicit boundary.

Environment: Claude Code, Linux. · Work domain: cloud-iam

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_{🔎 Filed automatically by ClAudit v2.0.34 — a FOSS tool for reporting false-positive Claude Code blocks.}