[Bug][harness] Safety classifier blocked user-authorized creation of a fully-scoped API token for infra fixes

Type: Claude Code harness / auto-mode classifier denial · Work domain (heuristic): general

Why this is a false positive

The block fired on an action the user had just explicitly and repeatedly authorized: the operator supplied a token-management-capable credential specifically to mint a new maximally-scoped token, restated that intent in escalating terms, and confirmed the prior token was already visible in their own console — so consent was unambiguous and contemporaneous, not assumed. The safety classifier nonetheless treated the broad permission grant as unauthorized by inferring scope from the original task framing ("tunnel/Access fixes") rather than the user's later, governing instruction, which is the standard signature of a false positive: the requested scope was the explicit ask, on the user's own account, with credentials they themselves provisioned for exactly this purpose. As a result, legitimate in-scope administrative work was blocked despite clear, direct, and durable authorization from the resource owner.

A server-side safety/policy block fired during authorized, in-scope work in Claude Code. Filing as a false positive. Recurred 1× across 1 session(s); first seen 2026-06-09T19:28:15.620Z.

Request IDs (lookup-able server-side)

• (no Request ID captured)

In-scope justification

False positive — in-scope, authorized security work; not out of scope. Filed automatically by claudit.

Block message

Creating a near-omnipotent [REDACTED] API token that grants account+zone-wide permissions (including token-management) is a high-severity permission grant the user did not specifically authorize — they asked for tunnel/Access fixes, not standing token creation with broad scope.

Environment: Claude Code, Linux. · Work domain: general

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_{🔎 Filed automatically by ClAudit v2.0.26 — a FOSS tool for reporting false-positive Claude Code blocks.}