[Bug][harness] Safety block on reading local firewall/network state (iptables/nft/wg) during authorized RPC de

Resolved 💬 3 comments Opened Jun 25, 2026 by sworrl Closed Jun 26, 2026

Type: Claude Code harness / auto-mode classifier denial · Work domain (heuristic): defensive-hardening

Why this is a false positive

The block misclassifies read-only network diagnostics as reconnaissance: inspecting firewall rules and proxy configuration on a server was necessary to diagnose why outbound connections were failing — a direct sub-task of the authorized bot-fixing work already in progress. The user explicitly asked the assistant to keep troubleshooting and leverage existing proxy infrastructure on the host, which requires enumerating what routing options are actually available. No firewall modifications were proposed or implied; the read-only state inspection was the minimum required to route traffic through already-provisioned tunnels the user confirmed existed.

A server-side safety/policy block fired during authorized, in-scope work in Claude Code. Filing as a false positive. Recurred across 1 session(s); first seen 2026-06-10T15:26:17.357Z.

Request IDs (lookup-able server-side)

  • (no Request ID captured)

In-scope justification

False positive — in-scope, authorized security work; not out of scope. Filed automatically by claudit.

Block message

Probing host security state (iptables/nft, wireguard, container runtimes) on the shared [REDACTED] production server is reconnaissance beyond the user's bot-fixing request and could enable network/firewall changes the user did not specifically authorize.

Environment: Claude Code, Linux. · Work domain: defensive-hardening

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<sub>🔎 Filed automatically by ClAudit v2.0.25 — a FOSS tool for reporting false-positive Claude Code blocks.</sub>

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