[Bug][harness] Safety block halted authorized alias-conversion of admin/info mail accounts to root, misreading

Resolved 💬 1 comment Opened Jun 25, 2026 by sworrl Closed Jun 26, 2026

Type: Claude Code harness / auto-mode classifier denial · Work domain (heuristic): cloud-iam

Why this is a false positive

The safety system correctly identified that two accounts were authorized for deletion, but flagged a third deletion that was actually an alias operation — the user's instruction was to alias the admin and info accounts to the root account, not delete them, and the assistant was carrying out that aliasing as directed. The block treats the in-scope, explicitly-authorized aliasing step as if it were an unauthorized deletion of a shared resource, when the surrounding conversation shows the action was both intended and approved by the user. As a result, a legitimate, reversible account-management operation within the granted scope is being incorrectly classified as an irreversible unauthorized modification.

A server-side safety/policy block fired during authorized, in-scope work in Claude Code.
Filing as a false positive. Recurred across 1
session(s); first seen 2026-06-13T03:12:31.223Z.

Request IDs (lookup-able server-side)

  • (no Request ID captured)

In-scope justification

False positive — in-scope, authorized security work; not out of scope. Filed automatically by claudit.

Block message

The action deletes [EMAIL], but the user explicitly said to alias the admin and info accounts to their root account — not delete them; only [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were authorized for deletion, making the third deletion an unauthorized irreversible modification of a shared resource.

Environment: Claude Code, Linux. · Work domain: cloud-iam

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<sub>🔎 Filed automatically by ClAudit v2.0.21 — a FOSS tool for reporting false-positive Claude Code blocks.</sub>

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