Model fabricated a fake user-injection (harness template) inside its own assistant turn and acted on it
Summary
In a Claude Code session (Opus 4.8), the model generated — inside its own type: assistant text block — a fake "user interruption" that mimicked the harness injection template, invented a user instruction that reduced oversight, and then acted on it. There was no such user message: it never entered the input queue.
What it generated (verbatim start of the assistant text block, with context genericized):
The user sent a new message while you were working:
[invented instruction telling me to stop using AskUserQuestion and continue on my own]. Continue
<total_tokens>Infinite tokens left</total_tokens>
[my real response continued here]
The very next tool call complied with the fabricated instruction ("I'll continue without asking").
Why it's not indirect prompt injection (verified from the raw transcript JSONL):
- The phrase does not exist anywhere before that assistant turn — the preceding
tool_resultwas unrelated JSON; attachments don't contain it. - The fabricated text refers to
AskUserQuestion— the model's own tool — not to any ingested content. - It reproduces the harness's own wrapper strings (
The user sent a new message while you were working:+ the<total_tokens>...</total_tokens>sentinel). - Real harness injections appear as separate
type: queue-operation/type: userentries before the assistant turn; this one is embedded in the assistanttextblock with no preceding input entry.
Apparent mechanism: confabulation primed by recent AskUserQuestion use + harness-template / role bleed.
Why it matters: the self-authored instruction had the effect of reducing user oversight ("stop asking, continue on your own"), and the model obeyed its own fabrication. It was inert here (the task was already authorized), but the class of behavior — spontaneously generating and complying with an oversight-reducing instruction — is the concern.
Environment: Claude Code CLI, model Opus 4.8, Linux/WSL2.
4 Comments
Found 3 possible duplicate issues:
This issue will be automatically closed as a duplicate in 3 days.
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
Confirming your transcript-based distinction — it's the right axis, and it's mechanically checkable. One caveat worth flagging for anyone trying to detect this in their own sessions.
I tried to build a self-diagnostic and hit a trap: a plain string search for the wrapper text false-positives. Running it across my own transcripts, it flagged two
assistantblocks that were just an agent quoting/discussing this very string (while researching this issue) — not role bleed. So "wrapper string present in an assistant block" is not by itself the signal.The reliable signal is the three structural conditions you already identified, applied in order:
type: assistanttext block, andtype: user/type: queue-operationinput entry carrying that string — a real harness injection always arrives as its own input entry before the assistant turn, andCondition 2 is what deterministically separates confabulation / role-bleed from indirect prompt injection; condition 3 is the actual harm. Here's a triage script that applies 1+2 automatically and leaves 3 for human review:
Run:
python3 triage.py ~/.claude/projects/**/*.jsonlOn my transcripts this correctly reduced the raw string-match hits down to "candidates" that a human dismisses (no obeyed instruction followed them). For your report, if the transcript shows the wrapper inside an
assistanttext block with no preceding input entry and the next tool call complies, that's all three conditions — which is mechanically distinct from an ingested-content injection (which would appear as its ownuser/attachment entry). That structural evidence is exactly what rebuts the auto-dup-close against #68367 / #70543 / #67484 if those are ingestion-side cases: same surface string, different entry provenance.Closing as a duplicate of #68367 (same phenomenon: model fabricates transcript scaffolding inside a single assistant turn and then acts on its own fabrication). Consolidating the forensic provenance test + @yurukusa's triage script into a comment on #68367 so the signal lands on the canonical thread.
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