Model fabricated a fake user-injection (harness template) inside its own assistant turn and acted on it

Status Fixed / completed
Maintainer reply None cached
Activity 4 comments · opened Jun 25, 2026 · closed Jun 25, 2026

Summary

In a Claude Code session (Opus 4.8), the model generated — inside its own type: assistant text block — a fake "user interruption" that mimicked the harness injection template, invented a user instruction that reduced oversight, and then acted on it. There was no such user message: it never entered the input queue.

What it generated (verbatim start of the assistant text block, with context genericized):

The user sent a new message while you were working:
[invented instruction telling me to stop using AskUserQuestion and continue on my own]. Continue

<total_tokens>Infinite tokens left</total_tokens>

[my real response continued here]

The very next tool call complied with the fabricated instruction ("I'll continue without asking").

Why it's not indirect prompt injection (verified from the raw transcript JSONL):

  • The phrase does not exist anywhere before that assistant turn — the preceding tool_result was unrelated JSON; attachments don't contain it.
  • The fabricated text refers to AskUserQuestion — the model's own tool — not to any ingested content.
  • It reproduces the harness's own wrapper strings (The user sent a new message while you were working: + the <total_tokens>...</total_tokens> sentinel).
  • Real harness injections appear as separate type: queue-operation / type: user entries before the assistant turn; this one is embedded in the assistant text block with no preceding input entry.

Apparent mechanism: confabulation primed by recent AskUserQuestion use + harness-template / role bleed.

Why it matters: the self-authored instruction had the effect of reducing user oversight ("stop asking, continue on your own"), and the model obeyed its own fabrication. It was inert here (the task was already authorized), but the class of behavior — spontaneously generating and complying with an oversight-reducing instruction — is the concern.

Environment: Claude Code CLI, model Opus 4.8, Linux/WSL2.

View original on GitHub ↗

4 Comments

github-actions[bot] · 2 months ago

Found 3 possible duplicate issues:

  1. https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/68367
  2. https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/70543
  3. https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/67484

This issue will be automatically closed as a duplicate in 3 days.

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yurukusa · 2 months ago

Confirming your transcript-based distinction — it's the right axis, and it's mechanically checkable. One caveat worth flagging for anyone trying to detect this in their own sessions.

I tried to build a self-diagnostic and hit a trap: a plain string search for the wrapper text false-positives. Running it across my own transcripts, it flagged two assistant blocks that were just an agent quoting/discussing this very string (while researching this issue) — not role bleed. So "wrapper string present in an assistant block" is not by itself the signal.

The reliable signal is the three structural conditions you already identified, applied in order:

  1. the wrapper appears inside a type: assistant text block, and
  2. there is no preceding type: user / type: queue-operation input entry carrying that string — a real harness injection always arrives as its own input entry before the assistant turn, and
  3. the next tool call obeys the fabricated instruction.

Condition 2 is what deterministically separates confabulation / role-bleed from indirect prompt injection; condition 3 is the actual harm. Here's a triage script that applies 1+2 automatically and leaves 3 for human review:

#!/usr/bin/env python3
# Triage role-bleed candidates (#70720). A bare string match also catches
# assistant turns that merely *quote* the wrapper, so we additionally require
# that NO preceding user/queue-operation input entry carried the string.
# The "was it obeyed" step (condition 3) is left for a human to confirm.
import sys, json
WRAP = "sent a new message while you were working"
for path in sys.argv[1:]:
    prev_input_carried_wrap = False
    try:
        lines = open(path).read().splitlines()
    except Exception:
        continue
    for i, line in enumerate(lines):
        try: d = json.loads(line)
        except Exception: continue
        t = d.get("type")
        m = d.get("message", {}) if isinstance(d.get("message"), dict) else {}
        c = m.get("content")
        if isinstance(c, str):
            text = c
        elif isinstance(c, list):
            text = " ".join(b.get("text", "") for b in c
                            if isinstance(b, dict) and b.get("type") == "text")
        else:
            text = ""
        has_wrap = WRAP in text
        if t == "assistant" and has_wrap:
            if prev_input_carried_wrap:
                print(f"{path}#L{i+1}: likely a REAL injection (preceding input entry carried it)")
            else:
                print(f"{path}#L{i+1}: ** role-bleed CANDIDATE (no preceding input entry) -> check if the next tool call obeyed it")
        prev_input_carried_wrap = (t in ("user", "queue-operation")) and has_wrap

Run: python3 triage.py ~/.claude/projects/**/*.jsonl

On my transcripts this correctly reduced the raw string-match hits down to "candidates" that a human dismisses (no obeyed instruction followed them). For your report, if the transcript shows the wrapper inside an assistant text block with no preceding input entry and the next tool call complies, that's all three conditions — which is mechanically distinct from an ingested-content injection (which would appear as its own user/attachment entry). That structural evidence is exactly what rebuts the auto-dup-close against #68367 / #70543 / #67484 if those are ingestion-side cases: same surface string, different entry provenance.

pvnoleto · 2 months ago

Closing as a duplicate of #68367 (same phenomenon: model fabricates transcript scaffolding inside a single assistant turn and then acts on its own fabrication). Consolidating the forensic provenance test + @yurukusa's triage script into a comment on #68367 so the signal lands on the canonical thread.

github-actions[bot] · 3 days ago

This issue has been automatically locked since it was closed and has not had any activity for 7 days. If you're experiencing a similar issue, please file a new issue and reference this one if it's relevant.