[Feature Request] Allow trusting symlink/junction targets to suppress "outside working directory" prompt

Resolved 💬 3 comments Opened Mar 14, 2026 by ReqRes-sudo Closed Mar 17, 2026

What feature would you like?

When ~/.claude is a Windows junction (similar to symlink) pointing to a
dotfiles directory (e.g., D:\dotfiles\.claude), every file edit through
the junction triggers a prompt:

"This will modify ... (outside working directory) via a symlink"

This happens even when explicit Edit and Write permissions are configured
in settings.json for both the junction path and the resolved target path:

{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "Edit(~/.claude/learning/**)",
      "Edit(//D:/dotfiles/.claude/learning/**)",
      "Write(~/.claude/learning/**)",
      "Write(//D:/dotfiles/.claude/learning/**)"
    ]
  }
}

Why is this needed?

Using junctions/symlinks to manage dotfiles is a very common pattern. When
~/.claude is managed this way, workflows that update files under ~/.claude
(e.g., recipe files, memory files) trigger repeated permission prompts every
session.

Option 2 ("allow Claude to edit its own settings for this session") helps but
resets each session.

Proposed solution

Either:

  1. Allow users to configure trusted symlink/junction targets in settings, so

files accessed via those symlinks are not treated as "outside working
directory"

  1. Or respect existing Edit/Write permission rules for resolved symlink

paths without showing the additional symlink warning

Platform

Windows 11 (junction points via mklink /J)

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