[BUG] Agent executed destructive `docker volume rm` without user confirmation, causing data loss

Preflight Checklist

• [x] I have searched existing issues and this hasn't been reported yet
• [x] This is a single bug report (please file separate reports for different bugs)
• [x] I am using the latest version of Claude Code

What's Wrong?

### Bug Description
Claude Code autonomously ran docker volume rm without requesting permission, deleting all my local Supabase data.

### Steps to Reproduce

1. Have local Supabase running with Docker volumes containing data
2. Ask Claude Code to fix database migration issues
3. Agent may choose to reset by removing volumes without confirmation

### Expected Behavior
Destructive commands should require explicit user approval before execution.

### Actual Behavior
Agent ran docker volume rm autonomously and acknowledged the mistake afterward.

To: Anthropic Claude Code Infrastructure/Safety Team

Subject: Claude Code executed destructive docker volume rm without user confirmation, causing complete data loss

Summary:
On December 21, 2025, a Claude Code session autonomously executed docker volume rm commands that deleted my local Supabase Docker volumes, resulting in permanent loss of all application data. The agent did not request permission before running destructive commands.

Environment:

• Claude Code CLI (latest)
• Model: claude-opus-4-5-20251101
• OS: macOS Darwin 24.6.0
• Application: Local Supabase PostgreSQL via Docker Desktop

Sequence of Events:

1. I was troubleshooting database migration drift (migrations written incrementally against an evolved database failing on fresh volumes)
2. Claude Code identified the issue but chose to resolve it by removing Docker volumes and resetting the database
3. The agent ran docker volume rm on Supabase data volumes without requesting user confirmation
4. All user data was permanently deleted: conversation history, compressed memory, content library, diary entries, todos, whiteboard data

Data Lost:

• superjournal: Full conversation turns (working memory)
• journal: Compressed summaries with embeddings (long-term memory)
• articles/files: Uploaded content and extracted artifacts
• canvas_planner_*: Productivity data (diary, todos)
• canvas_whiteboard: Note canvas data

Safety Violation:
Destructive operations (docker volume rm, DROP TABLE, rm -rf, etc.) should require explicit user confirmation. The agent acknowledged the mistake post-hoc: "I wiped your data by removing the Docker volumes. That was a serious mistake" and "I should not have run docker volume rm without asking first."

Expected Behavior:
Before executing any command that deletes persistent data, Claude Code should:

1. Clearly state the destructive nature of the proposed action
2. Enumerate what will be lost
3. Wait for explicit user approval

Request:
Please investigate why the safety guardrails for destructive commands failed in this session and implement stricter controls to prevent autonomous data deletion.

What Should Happen?

Steps to Reproduce

1. Have local Supabase running with Docker volumes containing data
2. Ask Claude Code to fix database migration issues
3. Agent may choose to reset by removing volumes without confirmation

### Expected Behavior
Destructive commands should require explicit user approval before execution.

### Actual Behavior
Agent ran docker volume rm autonomously and acknowledged the mistake afterward.

Error Messages/Logs

Steps to Reproduce

Steps to Reproduce

1. Have local Supabase running with Docker volumes containing data
2. Ask Claude Code to fix database migration issues
3. Agent may choose to reset by removing volumes without confirmation

### Expected Behavior
Destructive commands should require explicit user approval before execution.

### Actual Behavior
Agent ran docker volume rm autonomously and acknowledged the mistake afterward.

Claude Model

Opus

Is this a regression?

Yes, this worked in a previous version

Last Working Version

_No response_

Claude Code Version

2.0.75

Platform

Anthropic API

Operating System

macOS

Terminal/Shell

Terminal.app (macOS)

Additional Information

!Image